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W
hat do you remember from the economics class you took in col-
lege? Even if you didn’t take economics, what basic ideas do you
think are important for understanding the way markets work? In
either case, one thing you might come up with is that when the demand for a
good rises—when more and more people want more and more of that good—
its price will tend to increase. This basic piece of economic logic helps us
understand the phenomena we observe in many speciﬁc markets—from the
tendency of gasoline prices to rise as the summer sets in and people hit the
road on their family vacations, to the tendency for last year’s styles to fall in
price as consumers turn to the new fashions.
This notion paints a picture of the price of a good moving together in the
samedirectionwithitsquantity—whenpeoplearebuyingmore,itspriceisris-
ing. Of course supply matters, too, and thinking about variations in supply—
goods becoming more or less plentiful or more or less costly to produce—
complicates the picture. But in many cases such as the examples above, we
might expect movements up and down in demand to happen more frequently
than movements in supply. Certainly for goods produced by a stable industry
in an environment of little technological change, we would expect that many
movements in price and quantity are driven by movements in demand, which
wouldcausepriceandquantitytomoveupanddowntogether. Commonsense
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suggests that this logic would carry over to how one thinks about not only the
price of one good but also the prices of all goods. Should an average measure
of all prices in the economy—the consumer price index, for example—be
expected to move up when our total measures of goods produced and con-
sumed rise? And should faster growth in these quantities—as measured, say,
by gross domestic product—be accompanied by faster increases in prices?
That is, should inﬂation move up and down with real economic growth?
Thesimpleintuitionbehindthisseriesofquestionsisseriouslyincomplete
as a description of the behavior of prices and quantities at the macroeconomic
level. But it does form the basis for an idea at the heart of much macroe-
conomic policy analysis for at least a half century. This idea is called the
“Phillips curve,” and it embodies a hypothesis about the relationship between
inﬂation and real economic variables. It is usually stated not in terms of the
positive relationship between inﬂation and growth but in terms of a negative
relationship between inﬂation and unemployment. Since faster growth often
meansmoreintensiveutilizationofaneconomy’sresources,fastergrowthwill
be expected to come with falling unemployment. Hence, faster inﬂation is as-
sociated with lower unemployment. In this form, the Phillips curve looks like
the expression of a tradeoff between two bad economic outcomes—reducing
inﬂation requires accepting higher unemployment.
The ﬁrst important observation about this relationship is that the simple
intuitiondescribedatthebeginningofthisessayisnotimmediatelyapplicable
at the level of the economy-wide price level. That intuition is built on the
workings of supply and demand in setting the quantity and price of a speciﬁc
good. The price of that speciﬁc good is best understood as a relative price—
the price of that good compared to the prices of other goods. By contrast,
inﬂation is the rate of change of the general level of all prices. Recognizing
this distinction does not mean that rising demand for all goods—that is, rising
aggregate demand—would not make all prices rise. Rather, the important
implication of this distinction is that it focuses attention on what, besides
people’s underlying desire for more goods and services, might drive a general
increase in all prices. The other key factor is the supply of money in the
economy.
Economic decisions of producers and consumers are driven by relative
prices: a rising price of bagels relative to doughnuts might prompt a baker to
shiftproductionawayfromdoughnutsandtowardbagels. Ifwecouldimagine
asituationinwhichallpricesofall outputsandinputsintheeconomy, includ-
ing wages, rise at exactly the same rate, what effect on economic decisions
would we expect? A reasonable answer is “none.” Nothing will have become
more expensive relative to other goods, and labor income will have risen as
much as prices, leaving people no poorer or richer.
The thought experiment involving all prices and wages rising in equal
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tothefactthatthehypotheticalincreaseinpricesandwagescouldbeexpected
to result from a corresponding increase in the supply of money. Monetary
neutralityisanaturalstartingpointforthinkingabouttherelationshipbetween
inﬂation and real economic variables. If money is neutral, then an increase
in the supply of money translates directly into inﬂation and has no necessary
relationship with changes in real output, output growth, or unemployment.
Thatis, whenmoneyisneutral, thesimplesupply-and-demandintuitionabout
output growth and inﬂation does not apply to inﬂation associated with the
growth of the money supply.
The logic of monetary neutrality is indisputable, but is it relevant? The
logic arises from thinking about hypothetical “frictionless” economies in
which all market participants at all times have all the information they need
to price the goods they sell and to choose among the available goods, and in
which sellers can easily change the price they charge. Against this hypotheti-
cal benchmark, actual economies are likely to appear imperfect to the naked
eye. Andunderthemicroscopeofeconometricevidence,apositivecorrelation
between inﬂation and real growth does tend to show up. The task of modern
macroeconomics has been to understand these empirical relationships. What
are the “frictions” that impede monetary neutrality? Since monetary policy
is a key determinant of inﬂation, another important question is how the con-
duct of policy affects the observed relationships. And ﬁnally, what does our
understandingoftheserelationshipsimplyabouttheproperconductofpolicy?
The Phillips curve, viewed as a way of capturing how money might not
be neutral, has always been a central part of the way economists have thought
about macroeconomics and monetary policy. It also forms the basis, perhaps
implicitly, of popular understanding of the basic problem of economic policy;
namely, we want the economy to grow and unemployment to be low, but if
growth is too robust, inﬂation becomes a risk. Over time, many debates about
economic policy have boiled down to alternative understandings of what the
Phillipscurveisandwhatitmeans. Eventoday,viewsthateconomistsexpress
on the effects of macroeconomic policy in general and monetary policy in
particular often derive from what they think about the nature, the shape, and
the stability of the Phillips curve.
ThisessayseekstotracetheevolutionofourunderstandingofthePhillips
curve, from before its inception to contemporary debates about economic pol-
icy. The history presented in the pages that follow is by no means exhaus-
tive. Important parts of economists’ understanding of this relationship that
we neglect include discussions of how the observed Phillips curve’s statistical
relationship could emerge even under monetary neutrality.1 We also neglect
the literature on the possibility of real economic costs of inﬂation that arise
1 King and Plosser (1984).204 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
even when money is neutral.2 Instead, we seek to provide the broad outlines
of the intellectual development that has led to the role of the Phillips curve in
modern macroeconomics, emphasizing the interplay of economic theory and
empirical evidence.
After reviewing the history, we will turn to the current debate about the
Phillipscurveandhowittranslatesintodifferingviewsaboutmonetarypolicy.
People commonly talk about a central bank seeking to engineer a slowing of
the economy to bring about lower inﬂation. They think of the Phillips curve
as describing how much slowing is required to achieve a given reduction in
inﬂation. We believe that this reading of the Phillips curve as a lever that
a policymaker might manipulate mechanically can be misleading. By itself,
the Phillips curve is a statistical relationship that has arisen from the complex
interaction of policy decisions and the actions of private participants in the
economy. Importantly, choices made by policymakers play a large role in
determining the nature of the statistical Phillips curve. Understanding that
relationship—between policymaking and the Phillips curve—is a key ingre-
dient to sound policy decisions. We return to this theme after our historical
overview.
1. SOME HISTORY




assume that the economics profession’s prior consensus on the matter embod-
ied the presumption that money is neutral. But this in fact is not the case. The
idea of monetary neutrality has long coexisted with the notion that periods
of rising money growth and inﬂation might be accompanied by increases in
output and declines in unemployment. Robert Lucas (1996), in his Nobel
lecture on the subject of monetary neutrality, ﬁnds both ideas expressed in the
work of David Hume in 1752! Thomas Humphrey (1991) traces the notion of
a Phillips curve tradeoff throughout the writings of the classical economists
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Even Irving Fisher, whose statement of the
quantity theory of money embodied a full articulation of the consequences of
neutrality, recognized the possible real effects of money and inﬂation over the
course of a business cycle.
In early writings, these two opposing ideas—that money is neutral and
that it is associated with rising real growth—were typically reconciled by
the distinction between periods of time ambiguously referred to as “short
2 Cooley and Hansen (1989), for instance.
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run” and “long run.” The logic of monetary neutrality is essentially long-
run logic. The type of thought experiment the classical writers had in mind
was a one-time increase in the quantity of money circulating in an economy.
Their logic implied that, ultimately, this would merely amount to a change in
units of measurement. Given enough time for the extra money to spread itself
throughout the economy, all prices would rise proportionately. So while the
numberofunitsofmoneyneededtocompensateaday’slabormightbehigher,
theamountoffood,shelter,andclothingthataday’spaycouldpurchasewould
be exactly the same as before the increase in money and prices.
Againstthislogicstoodtheclassicaleconomists’observationsoftheworld
around them in which increases in money and prices appeared to bring in-
creases in industrial and commercial activity. This empirical observation did
not employ the kind of formal statistics as that used by modern economists
but simply the practice of keen observation. They would typically explain
the difference between their theory’s predictions (neutrality) and their obser-
vations by appealing to what economists today would call “frictions” in the
marketplace. Of particular importance in this instance are frictions that get in
thewayofpriceadjustmentormakeithardforbuyersandsellersofgoodsand
services to know when the general level of all prices is rising. If a craftsman
sees that he can sell his wares for an increased price but doesn’t realize that
all prices are rising proportionately, he might think that his goods are rising in
value relative to other goods. He might then take action to increase his output
so as to beneﬁt from the perceived rise in the worth of his labors.
This example shows how frictions in price adjustment can break the logic
of money neutrality. But such a departure is likely to be only temporary. You
can’t fool everybody forever, and eventually people learn about the general
inﬂation caused by an increase in money. The real effects of inﬂation should
then die out. It was in fact in the context of this distinction between long-run
neutrality and the short-run tradeoff between inﬂation and real growth that
John Maynard Keynes made his oft-quoted quip that “in the long run we are
all dead.” 4
Phillips’work was among the ﬁrst formal statistical analyses of the rela-
tionship between inﬂation and real economic activity. The data on the rate
of wage increase and the rate of unemployment for Phillips’ baseline period
of 1861–1913 are reproduced in Figure 1. These data show a clear negative
relationship—greater inﬂation tends to coincide with lower unemployment.
To highlight that relationship, Phillips ﬁt the curve in Figure 1 to the data. He
then examined a number of episodes, both within the baseline period and in
otherperiodsupthrough1957. Thegeneraltendencyofanegativerelationship
persists throughout.
4 Keynes (1923).206 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly























































A few years later, Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow, both eventual Nobel
Prize winners, took a look at the U.S. data from the beginning of the 20th
century through 1958.5 A similar scatter-plot to that in Figure 1 was less
deﬁnitive in showing the negative relationship between wage inﬂation and
unemployment. The authors were able to recover a pattern similar to Phillips’
bytakingouttheyearsoftheWorldWarsandtheGreatDepression. Theyalso
translated their ﬁndings into a relationship between unemployment and price
inﬂation. It is this relationship that economists now most commonly think of
as the “Phillips curve.”
SamuelsonandSolow’sPhillipscurveisreproducedinFigure2. Theyin-
terpret this curve as showing the combinations of unemployment and inﬂation
available to society. The implication is that policymakers must choose from
the menu traced out by the curve. An inﬂation rate of zero, or price stability,
5 Samuelson and Solow (1960).J. M. Lacker and J. A. Weinberg: Inﬂation and Unemployment 207

























































Source: Samuelson and Solow (1960).
appears to require an unemployment rate of about 51
2 percent. To achieve un-
employment of about 3 percent, which the authors viewed as approximately
full employment, the curve suggests that inﬂation would need to be close to 5
percent.
SamuelsonandSolowdidnotproposethattheirestimatedcurvedescribed
a permanent relationship that would never change. Rather, they presented it
as a description of the array of possibilities facing the economy in “the years
just ahead.” 6 While recognizing that the relationship might change beyond
this near horizon, they remained largely agnostic on how and why it might
change. As a ﬁnal note, however, they suggest institutional reforms that might
produce a more favorable tradeoff (shifting the curve in Figure 2 down and
to the left). These involve measures to limit the ability of businesses and
unions to exercise monopoly control over prices and wages, or even direct
6 Ibid., p. 193.208 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
wageandpricecontrols. Theirclosingdiscussionsuggeststhatthey,likemany
economistsatthetime, viewedbothinﬂationandthefrictionsthatkeptmoney
and inﬂation from being neutral as at least partly structural—hard-wired into
the institutions of modern, corporate capitalism. Indeed, they concluded their
paperwithspeculationaboutinstitutionalreformsthatcouldmovethePhillips
curve down and to the left. This was an interpretation that was compatible
with the idea of a more permanent tradeoff that derived from the structure of
the economy and that could be exploited by policymakers seeking to engineer
lasting changes in economic performance.
By the 1960s, then, the Phillips curve tradeoff had become an essential
part of the Keynesian approach to macroeconomics that dominated the ﬁeld
in the decades following the Second World War. Guided by this relationship,
economists argued that the government could use ﬁscal policy—government
spending or tax cuts—to stimulate the economy toward full employment with
a fair amount of certainty about what the cost would be in terms of increased
inﬂation. Alternatively, such a stimulative effect could be achieved by mon-
etary policy. In either case, policymaking would be a conceptually simple
matter of cost-beneﬁt analysis, although its implementation was by no means
simple. And since the costs of a small amount of inﬂation to society were
thought to be low, it seemed worthwhile to achieve a lower unemployment
rate at the cost of tolerating only a little more inﬂation.
Turning the Focus to Expectations
This approach to economic policy implicitly either denied the long-run neu-
trality of money or thought it irrelevant. A distinct minority view within the
profession, however, continued to emphasize limitations on the ability of ris-
ing inﬂation to bring down unemployment in a sustained way. The leading
proponentofthisviewwasMiltonFriedman, whoseNobelPrizeawardwould
cite his Phillips curve work. In his presidential address to theAmerican Eco-
nomics Association, Friedman began his discussion of monetary policy by
stipulating what monetary policy cannot do. Chief among these was that it
couldnot“pegtherateofunemploymentformorethanverylimitedperiods.” 7
Attempts to use expansionary monetary policy to keep unemployment persis-
tently below what he referred to as its “natural rate” would inevitably come at
the cost of successively higher inﬂation. Key to his argument was the distinc-
tion between anticipated and unanticipated inﬂation. The short-run tradeoff
between inﬂation and unemployment depended on the inﬂation expectations
of the public. If people generally expected price stability (zero inﬂation), then
monetary policy that brought about inﬂation of 3 percent would stimulate the
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economy,raisingoutputgrowthandreducingunemployment. Butsupposethe
economy had been experiencing higher inﬂation, of say 5 percent, for some
time, and that people had come to expect that rate of increase to continue.
Then, a policy that brought about 3 percent inﬂation would actually slow the
economy, making unemployment tend to rise.
By emphasizing the public’s inﬂation expectations, Friedman’s analysis
drew a link that was largely absent in earlier Phillips curve analyses. Speciﬁ-
cally, his argument was that not only is monetary policy primarily responsible
for determining the rate of inﬂation that will prevail, but it also ultimately de-
termines the location of the entire Phillips curve. He argued that the economy
would be at the natural rate of unemployment in the absence of unanticipated
inﬂation. That is, the ability of a small increase in inﬂation to stimulate eco-
nomic output and employment relied on the element of surprise. Both the
inﬂation that people had come to expect and the ability to create a surprise
were then consequences of monetary policy decisions.
Friedman’s argument involved the idea of a “natural rate” of unemploy-
ment. This natural rate was something that was determined by the structure
of the economy, its rate of growth, and other real factors independent of mon-
etary policy and the rate of inﬂation. While this natural rate might change
over time, at any point in time, unemployment below the natural rate could
only be achieved by policies that created inﬂation in excess of that anticipated
by the public. But if inﬂation remained at the elevated level, people would
come to expect higher inﬂation, and its stimulative effect would be lost. Un-
employment would move back toward its natural rate. That is, the Phillips
curve would shift up and to its right, as shown in Figure 3.
The ﬁgure shows a hypothetical example in which the natural rate of
unemployment is 5 percent and people initially expect inﬂation of 1 percent.
A surprise inﬂation of 3 percent drives unemployment down to 3 percent.
But sustained inﬂation at the higher rate ultimately changes expectations, and
the Phillips curve shifts back so that the natural rate of unemployment is
achieved but now at 3 percent inﬂation. This analysis, which takes account of
inﬂation expectations, is referred to as the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve. An independent and contemporaneous development of this approach
to the Phillips curve was given by Edmund Phelps, winner of the 2006 Nobel
Prize in economics.8 Phelps developed his version of the Phillips curve by
workingthroughtheimplicationsoffrictionsinthesettingofwagesandprices,
which anticipated much of the work that followed.
The reasoning of Friedman and Phelps implied that attempts to exploit
systematically the Phillips curve to bring about lower unemployment would
succeed only temporarily at best. To have an effect on real activity, monetary
8 Phelps (1967).210 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Expectations-Augmented Phillips Curve
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Notes: When expected inﬂation is 1 percent, an unanticipated increase in inﬂation will
initially bring unemployment down. But expectations will eventually adjust, bringing un-
employment back to its natural rate (u∗) at the higher rate of inﬂation.
policy needed to bring about inﬂation in excess of people’s expectations. But
eventually,peoplewouldcometoexpecthigherinﬂation,andthepolicywould
lose its stimulative effect. This insight comes from an assumption that people
base their expectations of inﬂation on their observation of past inﬂation. If,
instead,peoplearemoreforwardlookingandunderstandwhatthepolicymaker
is trying to do, they might adjust their expectations more quickly, causing the
rise in inﬂation to lose much of even its temporary effect on real activity. In
a sense, even the short-run relationship relied on people being fooled. One
way people might be fooled is if they are simply unable to distinguish general
inﬂation from a change in relative prices. This confusion, sometimes referred
to as money illusion, could cause people to react to inﬂation as if it were a
change in relative prices. For instance, workers, seeing their nominal wages
rise but not recognizing that a general inﬂation is in process, might react as if
their real income were rising. That is, they might increase their expenditures
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Robert Lucas, another Nobel Laureate, demonstrated how behavior re-
sembling money illusion could result even with ﬁrms and consumers who
fully understood the difference between relative prices and the general price
level.9 In his analysis, confusion comes not from people’s misunderstanding,
but from their inability to observe all of the economy’s prices at one time. His
was the ﬁrst formal analysis showing how a Phillips curve relationship could
emergeinaneconomywithforward-lookingdecisionmakers. Liketheworkof
Friedman and Phelps, Lucas’implications for policymakers were cautionary.
The relationship between inﬂation and real activity in his analysis emerged
most strongly when policy was conducted in an unpredictable fashion, that is,
when policymaking was more a source of volatility than stability.
The Great Inﬂation
The expectations-augmented Phillips curve had the stark implication that any
attempttoutilizetherelationshipbetweeninﬂationandrealactivitytoengineer
persistentlylowunemploymentatthecostofalittlemoreinﬂationwasdoomed
to failure. The experience of the 1970s is widely taken to be a conﬁrmation of
this hypothesis. The historical relationship identiﬁed by Phillips, Samuelson,
andSolow,andotherearlierwritersappearedtobreakdownentirely,asshown
bythescatter-plotofthedataforthe1970sinFigure4. Throughoutthisdecade,
both inﬂation and unemployment tended to grow, leading to the emergence of
the term “stagﬂation” in the popular lexicon.
Onepossibleexplanationfortheexperienceofthe1970sisthatthedecade
was simply a case of bad luck. The Phillips curve shifted about unpredictably
as the economy was battered by various external shocks. The most notable
of these shocks were the dramatic increases in energy prices in 1973 and
againlaterinthedecade. Suchsupplyshocksworsenedtheavailabletradeoff,
making higher unemployment necessary at any given level of inﬂation.
By contrast, viewing the decade through the lens of the expectations-
augmented Phillips curve suggests that policy shared the blame for the dis-
appointing results. Policymakers attempted to shield the real economy from
the effects of aggregate shocks. Guided by the Phillips curve, this effort often
implied a choice to tolerate higher inﬂation rather than allowing unemploy-
ment to rise. This type of policy choice follows from viewing the statistical
relationshipPhillipsﬁrstfoundinthedataasamenuofpolicyoptions, assug-
gested by Samuelson and Solow. But the arguments made by Friedman and
Phelps imply that such a tradeoff is short lived at best. Unemployment would
ultimately return to its natural rate at the higher rate of inﬂation. So, while
therelativeimportanceofluckandpolicyforthepoormacroeconomicperfor-
9 Lucas (1972).212 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly







































Notes: Inﬂation rate is seasonally-adjusted CPI, Fourth Quarter.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics/Haver Analytics.
manceofthe1970scontinuestobedebatedbyeconomists, weﬁndapowerful
lesson in the history of that decade.10 The macroeconomic performance of
the 1970s is largely what the expectations-augmented Phillips curve predicts
when policymakers try to exploit a tradeoff that they mistakenly believe to be
stable.
The insights of Friedman, Phelps, and Lucas pointed to the complicated
interaction between policymaking and statistical analysis. Relationships we
observe in past data were inﬂuenced by past policy. When policy changes,
people’sbehaviormaychangeandsotoomaystatisticalrelationships. Hence,
thehistoryofthe1970scanbereadasanillustrationofLucas’critiqueofwhat
was at the time the consensus approach to policy analysis.11
10Velde (2004) provides an excellent overview of this debate. A nontechnical description of
the major arguments can be found in Sumo (2007).
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Focusing attention on the role of expectations in the Phillips curve creates
a challenge for policymakers seeking to use monetary policy to manage real
economic activity. At any point in time, the current state of the economy
and the private sector’s expectations may imply a particular Phillips curve.
AssumingthatthePhillipscurvedescribesastablerelationship,apolicymaker
might choose a preferred inﬂation-unemployment combination. That very
choice, however, can alter expectations, causing the tradeoff to change. The
policymaker’s problem is, in effect, a game played against a public that is
trying to anticipate policy. What’s more, this game is repeated over and over,
eachtimeapolicychoicemustbemade. Thiscomplicatedinterdependenceof
policychoicesandprivatesectoractionsandexpectationswasstudiedbyFinn
Kydland and Edward C. Prescott.12 In one of the papers for which they were
awarded the 2005 Nobel Prize, they distinguish between rules and discretion
as approaches to policymaking. By discretion, they mean period-by-period
decisionmaking in which the policymaker takes a fresh look at the costs and
beneﬁts of alternative inﬂation levels at each moment. They contrast this
with a setting in which the policymaker makes a one-time decision about the
best rule to guide policy. They show that discretionary policy would result in
higher inﬂation and no lower unemployment than the once-and-for-all choice
of a policy rule.
Recent work by Thomas Sargent and various coauthors shows how dis-
cretionary policy, as studied by Kydland and Prescott, can lead to the type of
inﬂation outcomes experienced in the 1970s.13 This analysis assumes that the
policymakerisuncertainofthepositionofthePhillipscurve. Inthefaceofthis
uncertainty, the policymaker estimates a Phillips curve from historical data.
Seeking to exploit a short-run, expectations-augmented Phillips curve—that
is, pursuing discretionary policy—the policymaker chooses among inﬂation-
unemployment combinations described by the estimated Phillips curve. But
the policy choices themselves cause people’s beliefs about policy to change,
which causes the response to policy choices to change. Consequently, when
thepolicymakerusesnewdatatoupdatetheestimatedPhillipscurve,thecurve
will have shifted. This process of making policy while also trying to learn
about the location of the Phillips curve can lead a policymaker to choices that
result in persistently high inﬂation outcomes.
In addition to the joint rise in inﬂation and unemployment during the
1970s, other empirical evidence pointed to the importance of expectations.
Sargent studied the experience of countries that had suffered from very high
inﬂation.14 In countries where monetary reforms brought about sudden and
rapid decelerations in inﬂation, he found that the cost in terms of reduced
12 Kydland and Prescott (1977).
13 Sargent (1999), Cogley and Sargent (2005), and Sargent, Williams, and Zha (2006).
14 Sargent (1986).214 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
output or increased unemployment tended to be much lower than standard
Phillips curve tradeoffs would suggest. One interpretation of these ﬁndings
is that the disinﬂationary policies undertaken tended to be well-anticipated.
Policymakersmanagedtocrediblyconvincethepublicthattheywouldpursue
these policies. Falling inﬂation that did not come as a surprise did not have
large real economic costs.
On a smaller scale in terms of peak inﬂation rates, another exercise in
dramatic disinﬂation was conducted by the Federal Reserve under Chairman
Paul Volcker.15 As inﬂation rose to double-digit levels in the late 1970s,
contemporaneous estimates of the cost in unemployment and lost output that
would be necessary to bring inﬂation down substantially were quite large.
A common range of estimates was that the 6 percentage-point reduction in
inﬂation that was ultimately brought about would require output from 9 to 27
percent below capacity annually for up to four years.16 Beginning in October
1979, the Fed took drastic steps, raising the federal funds rate as high as 19
percent in 1980. The result was a steep, but short recession. Overall, the costs
oftheVolckerdisinﬂationappeartohavebeensmallerthanhadbeenexpected.
A standard estimate, which appears in a popular economics textbook, is one
in which the reduction in output during the Volcker disinﬂation amounted to
less than a 4 percent annual shortfall relative to capacity.17 This amount is a
signiﬁcant cost, but it is substantially less than many had predicted before the
fact. Again, onepossiblereasoncouldbethattheFed’scourseofactioninthis
episode became well-anticipated once it commenced. While the public might
not have known the extent of the actions the Fed would take, the direction of
the change in policy may well have become widely understood. By the same
token, and as argued by Goodfriend and King, remaining uncertainty about
how far and how persistently the Fed would bring inﬂation down may have
resulted in the costs of disinﬂation being greater than they might otherwise
have been.
The experience of the 1970s, together with the insights of economists
emphasizing expectations, ultimately brought the credibility of monetary pol-
icy to the forefront in thinking about the relationship between inﬂation and
the real economy. Credibility refers to the extent to which the central bank
can convince the public of its intention with regard to inﬂation. Kydland and
Prescott showed that credibility does not come for free. There is always a
short-run gain from allowing inﬂation to rise a little so as to stimulate the real
economy. To establish credibility for a low rate of inﬂation, the central bank
must convince the public that it will not pursue that short-run gain.
15 Goodfriend and King (2005).
16 Ibid.
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Theexperienceofthe1980sand1990scanbereadasanexerciseinbuild-
ing credibility. In several episodes during that period, inﬂation expectations
roseasdoubtswereraisedabouttheFed’sabilitytomaintainitscommitmentto
low inﬂation. These episodes, labeled inﬂation scares by Marvin Goodfriend,
were marked by rapidly rising spreads between long-term and short-term in-
terest rates.18 Goodfriend identiﬁes inﬂation scares in 1980, 1983, and 1987.
ThesetendedtocomeduringorfollowingepisodesinwhichtheFedresponded
to real economic weakness with reductions (or delayed increases) in its fed-
eral funds rate target. In these instances, Fed policymakers reacted to signs of
rising inﬂation expectations by raising interest rates. These systematic policy
responses in the 1980s and 1990s were an important part of the process of
building credibility for lower inﬂation.
2. THE “MODERN” PHILLIPS CURVE
The history of the Phillips curve shows that the empirical relationship shifts
over time, and there is evidence that those movements are linked to the pub-
lic’s inﬂation expectations. But what does the history say about why this
relationship exists? Why is it that there is a statistical relationship between
inﬂationandrealeconomicactivity, evenintheshortrun? Theearliestwriters
and those that followed them recognized that the short-run tradeoff must arise
from frictions that stand in the way of monetary neutrality. There are many
possible sources of such frictions. They may arise from the limited nature of
the information individuals have about the full array of prices for all products
in the economy, as emphasized by Lucas. Frictions might also stem from
the fact that not all people participate in all markets, so that different markets
might be affected differently by changes in monetary policy. One simple type
offrictionisalimitationontheﬂexibilitysellershaveinadjustingthepricesof
the goods they sell. If there are no limitations all prices can adjust seamlessly
wheneverdemandorcostconditionschange,thenachangeinmonetarypolicy
will, again, affect different markets differently.
Deriving a Phillips Curve from Price-Setting Behavior
Thisprice-settingfrictionhasbecomeapopulardeviceforeconomistsseeking
to model the behavior of economies with a short-run Phillips curve. To see
how such a friction leads to a Phillips curve, think about a business that is
setting a price for its product and does not expect to get around to setting the
price again for some time. Typically, the business will choose a price based
on its own costs of production and the demand that it faces for its goods. But
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because that business expects its price to be ﬁxed for a while, its price choice
will also depend on what it expects to happen to its costs and its demand
between when it sets its price this time and when it sets its price the next time.
Iftheprice-settingbusinessthinksthatinﬂationwillbehighintheinterim
between its price adjustments, then it will expect its relative price to fall. As
average prices continue to rise, a good with a temporarily ﬁxed price gets
cheaper. The ﬁrm will naturally be interested in its average relative price
duringtheperiodthatitspriceremainsﬁxed. Thehighertheinﬂationexpected
by the ﬁrm up until its next price adjustment, the higher the current price it
will set. This reasoning, applied to all the economy’s sellers of goods and
services, leads directly to a close relationship between current inﬂation and
expected future inﬂation.
This description of price-setting behavior implies that current inﬂation
dependsontherealcostsofproductionandexpectedfutureinﬂation. Thereal
costs of production for businesses will rise when the aggregate use of produc-
tive resources rises, for instance because rising demand for labor pushes up
real wages.19 The result is a Phillips curve relationship between inﬂation and
a measure of real economic activity, such as output growth or unemployment.
Currentinﬂationriseswithexpectedfutureinﬂationandfallsascurrentunem-
ployment rises relative to its “natural” rate (or as current output falls relative
to the trend rate of output growth).
A Phillips Curve in a “Complete” Modern Model
Theprice-settingfrictionsthatarepartofmanymodernmacroeconomicmod-
els are really not that different from arguments that economists have always
made about reasons for the short-run nonneutrality of money. What distin-
guishesthemodernapproachisnotjustthemoreformal,mathematicalderiva-
tion of a Phillips curve relationship, but more importantly, the incorporation
of this relationship into a complete model of the macroeconomy. The word
“complete” here has a very speciﬁc meaning, referring to what economists
call “general equilibrium.” The general equilibrium approach to studying
economic activity recognizes the interdependence of disparate parts of the
economy and emphasizes that all macroeconomic variables such as GDP, the
level of prices, and unemployment are all determined by fundamental eco-
nomic forces acting at the level of individual households and businesses. The
completeness of a general equilibrium model also allows for an analysis of
the effects of alternative approaches to macroeconomic policy, as well as an
evaluation of the relative merits of alternative policies in terms of their effects
on the economic well-being of the people in the economy.
19 There are a number of technical assumptions needed to make this intuitive connection
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ThePhillipscurveisonlyonepartofacompletemacroeconomicmodel—
one equation in a system of equations. Another key component describes how
real economic activity depends on real interest rates. Just as the Phillips curve
is derived from a description of the price-setting decisions of businesses, this
other relationship, which describes the demand side of the economy, is based
on households’ and business’ decisions about consumption and investment.
These decisions involve people’s demand for resources now, as compared to
their expected demand in the future. Their willingness to trade off between
the present and the future depends on the price of that tradeoff—the real rate
of interest.
One source of interdependence between different parts of the model—
different equations—is in the real rate of interest. A real rate is a nominal
rate—the interest rates we actually observe in ﬁnancial markets—adjusted
for expected inﬂation. Real rates are what really matter for households’ and
ﬁrms’ decisions. So on the demand side of the economy, people’s choices
about consumption and investment depend on what they expect for inﬂation,
which comes, in part, from the pricing behavior described by the Phillips
curve. Another source of interdependence comes in the way the central bank
inﬂuences nominal interest rates by setting the rate charged on overnight,
interbankloans(thefederalfundsrateintheUnitedStates). Acompletemodel
alsorequiresadescriptionofhowthecentralbankchangesitsnominalinterest
rate target in response to changing economic conditions (such as inﬂation,
growth, or unemployment).
In a complete general equilibrium analysis of an economy’s performance,
all three parts—the Phillips curve, the demand side, and central
bank behavior—work together to determine the evolution of economic vari-
ables. But many of the economic choices people make on a day-to-day basis
depend not only on conditions today, but also on how conditions are expected
to change in the future. Such expectations in modern macroeconomic mod-
els are commonly described through the assumption of rational expectations.
This assumption simply means that the public—households and ﬁrms whose
decisions drive real economic activity—fully understands how the economy
evolves over time and how monetary policy shapes that evolution. It also
means that people’s decisions will depend on well-informed expectations not
only of the evolution of future fundamental conditions, but of future policy
as well. While discussions of a central bank’s credibility typically assume
that there are things related to policymaking about which the public is not
fully certain, these discussions retain the presumption that people are forward
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Implications and Uses of the ModernApproach
A Phillips curve that is derived as part of a model that includes price-setting
frictions is often referred to as the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).20
A complete general equilibrium model that incorporates this version of the
PhillipscurvehasbeenreferredtoastheNewNeoclassicalSynthesismodel.21
These models, like any economic model, are parsimonious descriptions of
reality. We do not take them as exact descriptions of how a modern economy
functions. Rather, we look to them to capture the most important forces at
work in determining macroeconomic outcomes. The key equations in new
neoclassical or new Keynesian models all involve assumptions or approxi-
mations that simplify the analysis without altering the fundamental economic
forces at work. Such simpliﬁcations allow the models to be a useful guide to
our thinking about the economy and the effects of policy.
ThemodernPhillipscurveissimilartotheexpectations-augmentedPhillips
curve in that inﬂation expectations are important to the relationship between
current inﬂation and unemployment. But its derivation from forward-looking
price-setting behavior shifts the emphasis to expectations of future inﬂation.
Ithasimplicationssimilartothelong-runneutralityofmoney,becauseifinﬂa-
tion is constant over time, then current inﬂation is equal to expected inﬂation.
Then, whatever that constant rate of inﬂation, unemployment must return to
the rate implied by the underlying structure of the economy, that is, to a rate
that might be considered the “natural” unemployment. Money is not truly
neutral in these models, however. Rather, the pricing frictions underlying the
modelsimplythattherearerealeconomiccoststoinﬂation. Becausesellersof
goods adjust their prices at different times, inﬂation makes the relative prices
of different goods vary, and this distorts sellers’ and buyers’ decisions. This
distortion is greater, the greater the rate of inﬂation.
TheexpectationalnatureofthePhillipscurvealsomeansthatpoliciesthat
have a short-run effect on inﬂation will induce real movements in output or
unemploymentmainlyiftheshort-runmovementininﬂationisnotexpectedto
persist. In this sense, the modern Phillips curve also embodies the importance
ofmonetarypolicycredibility, sinceitiscredibilitythatwouldallowexpected
inﬂation to remain stable, even as inﬂation ﬂuctuated in the near term.
Amoregeneralwayofemphasizingtheimportanceofcredibilityistosay
thatthemodernPhillipscurveimpliesthatthebehaviorofinﬂationwilldepend
crucially on people’s understanding of how the central bank is conducting
monetary policy. What people think about the central bank’s objectives and
strategy will determine expectations of inﬂation, especially over the long run.
Uncertainty about these aspects of policy will cause people to try to make
20 Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler (1999).
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inferences about future policy from the actual policy they observe. Even if
the central bank makes statements about its long-run objectives and strategy,
peoplewillstilltrytomakeinferencesfromthepolicyactionstheysee. Butin
this case, the inference that people will try to make is slightly simpler: people
must determine if actual policy is consistent with the stated objectives.
Does this newest incarnation of the Phillips curve present a central bank
withtheopportunitytoactivelymanagerealeconomicactivitythroughchoos-
ingmoreorlessinﬂationarypolicies? Theassumptionthatpeopleareforward
looking in forming expectations about future policy and inﬂation limits the
scopeformanagingrealgrowthorunemploymentthroughPhillipscurvetrade-
offs. An attempt to manage such growth or unemployment persistently would
translate into the public’s expectations of inﬂation causing the Phillips curve
to shift. This is another characteristic that the modern approach shares with
the older expectations-augmented Phillips curve.
What this modern framework does allow is the analysis of alternative
monetary policy rules—that is, how the central bank sets its nominal interest
rate in response to such economic variables as inﬂation, relative to the central
bank’starget,andtheunemploymentrateortherateofoutputgrowthrelativeto
thecentralbank’sunderstandingoftrendgrowth.22 Atypicalrulethatroughly
captures the actual behavior of most central banks would state, for instance,
that the central bank raises the interest rate when inﬂation is higher than its
targetandlowerstheinterestratewhenunemploymentrises. Alternativerules
might make different assumptions, for instance, about how much the central
bank moves the interest rate in response to changes in the macroeconomic
variables that it is concerned about. The complete model can then be used to
evaluatehowdifferentrulesperformintermsofthelong-runlevelsofinﬂation
and unemployment they produce, or more generally in terms of the economic
well-being generated for people in the economy. A typical result is that rules
that deliver lower and less variable inﬂation are better both because low and
stable inﬂation is a good thing and because such rules can also deliver less
variability in real economic activity. Further, lower inﬂation has the beneﬁt
of reducing the costs from distorted relative prices.
While low inﬂation is a preferred outcome, it is typically not possible,
in models or in reality, to engineer a policy that delivers the same low target
rate of inﬂation every month or quarter. The economy is hit by any number
of shocks that can move both real output and inﬂation around from month to
month—large energy price movements, for example. In the presence of such
shocks, a good policy might be one that, while not hitting its inﬂation target
each month, always tends to move back toward its target and never stray too
far.
22 We use the term “monetary policy rule” in the very general sense of any systematic pattern
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Complete models incorporating a modern Phillips curve also allow
economists to formalize the notion of monetary policy credibility. Remember
that credibility refers to what people believe about the way the central bank
intends to conduct policy. If people are uncertain about what rule best de-
scribes the behavior of the central bank, then they will try to learn from what
they see the central bank doing. This learning can make people’s expectations
aboutfuturepolicyevolveinacomplicatedway. Ingeneral, uncertaintyabout
the central bank’s policy, or doubts about its commitment to low inﬂation, can
raise the cost (in terms of output or employment) of reducing inﬂation. That
is, theshort-runrelationshipbetweeninﬂationandunemploymentdependson
the public’s long-run expectations about monetary policy and inﬂation.
Themodernapproachembodiesmanyfeaturesoftheearlierthinkingabout
thePhillipscurve. Thecharacterizationofpolicyasasystematicpatternofbe-
havior employed by the central bank, providing the framework within which
people form systematic expectations about future policy, follows the work
of Kydland and Prescott. And the focus on expectations itself, of course,
originated with Friedman. Within this modern framework, however, some
important debates remain unsettled. While our characterization of the frame-
work has emphasized the forward-looking nature of people’s expectations,
some economists believe that deviations from this benchmark are important
for understanding the dynamic behavior of inﬂation. We turn to this question
in the next section.
We have described here an approach that has been adopted by many con-
temporaryeconomistsforappliedcentralbankpolicyanalysis. Butweshould
note that this approach is not without its critics. Many economists view the
price-setting frictions that are at the core of this approach as ad hoc and un-
persuasive. This critique points to the value of a deeper theory of ﬁrms’
price-setting behavior. Moreover, there are alternative frictions that can also
rationalize monetary nonneutrality. Alternatives include frictions that limit
the information available to decisionmakers or that limit some people’s par-
ticipation in some markets. So while the approach we’ve described does not
represent the only possible modern model, it has become a popular workhorse
in policy research.
3. HOW WELL DOES THE MODERN PHILLIPS CURVE FIT
THE DATA?
The Phillips curve began as a relationship drawn to ﬁt the data. Over time,
it has evolved as economists’ understanding of the forces driving those data
has developed. The interplay between theory—the application of economic
logic—and empirical facts has been an important part of this process of dis-
covery. The recognition of the importance of expectations developed together
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modern Phillips curve represents an attempt to study the behavior of both
inﬂation and real variables using models that incorporate the lessons of Fried-
man, Phelps, and Lucas and that are rich enough to produce results that can
be compared to real world data.
Attempts to ﬁt the modern, or New Keynesian, Phillips curve to the data
have come up against a challenging ﬁnding. The theory behind the short-run
relationship implies that current inﬂation should depend on current real activ-
ity, as measured by unemployment or some other real variable, and expected
future inﬂation. When estimating such an equation, economists have often
found that an additional variable is necessary to explain the behavior of in-
ﬂation over time. In particular, these studies ﬁnd that past inﬂation is also
important.23
Inﬂation Persistence
The ﬁnding that past inﬂation is important for the behavior of current and fu-
tureinﬂation—thatis,theﬁndingofinﬂationpersistence—impliesthatmove-
ments in inﬂation have persistent effects on future inﬂation, apart from any
effects on unemployment or expected inﬂation. Such persistence, if it were
an inherent part of the structure and dynamics of the economy, would create a
challenge for policymakers to reduce inﬂation by reducing people’s expecta-
tions. Remember that we stated earlier the possibility that if the central bank
could convince the public that it was going to bring inﬂation down, then the
desired reduction might be achieved with little cost in unemployment or out-
put. Inherent inﬂation persistence would make such a strategy problematic.
Inherent persistence makes the set of choices faced by the policymaker closer
to that originally envisioned by Samuelson and Solow. The faster one tries to
bring down inﬂation, the greater the real economic costs.
Inherent persistence in inﬂation might be thought to arise if not all price-
setters in the economy were as forward looking as in the description given
earlier. If, instead of basing their price decisions on their best forecast of
future inﬂation behavior, some ﬁrms simply based current price choices on
the past behavior of inﬂation, this backward-looking pricing would impart
persistence to inﬂation. Jordi Gal´ ı and Mark Gertler, who took into account
the possibility that the economy is populated by a combination of forward-
lookingandbackward-lookingparticipants,introducedahybrid Phillipscurve
in which current inﬂation depends on both expected future inﬂation and past
inﬂation.24
23 Fuhrer (1997).
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An alternative explanation for inﬂation persistence is that it is a result pri-
marily of the conduct of monetary policy. The evolution of people’s inﬂation
expectations depends on the evolution of the conduct of policy. If there are
signiﬁcant and persistent shifts in policy conduct, expectations will evolve as
peoplelearnaboutthechanges. Inthisexplanation,inﬂationpersistenceisnot
the result of backward-looking decisionmakers in the economy but is instead
the result of the interaction of changing policy behavior and forward-looking
private decisions by households and businesses.25
Anotherpossibilityisthatinﬂationpersistenceistheresultofthenatureof
theshockshittingtheeconomy. Iftheseshocksarethemselvespersistent—that
is, bad shocks tend to be followed by more bad shocks—then that persistence
can lead to persistence in inﬂation. The way to assess the relative importance
of alternative possible sources of persistence is to estimate the multiple equa-
tions that make up a more complete model of the economy. This approach, in
contrast with the estimation of a single Phillips curve equation, allows for ex-
plicitly considering the roles of changing monetary policy, backward-looking
pricing behavior, and shocks in generating inﬂation persistence. A typical
ﬁnding is that the backward-looking terms in the hybrid Phillips curve appear
considerably less important for explaining the dynamics of inﬂation than in
single equation estimation.26
The scientiﬁc debate on the short-run relationship between inﬂation and
realeconomicactivityhasnotyetbeenfullyresolved. Onthecentralquestion
oftheimportanceofbackward-lookingbehavior, commonsensesuggeststhat
there are certainly people in the real-world economy who behave that way.
Not everyone stays up-to-date enough on economic conditions to make so-
phisticated, forward-looking decisions. People who do not may well resort
to rules of thumb that resemble the backward-looking behavior in some eco-
nomic models. On the other hand, people’s behavior is bound to be affected
by what they believe to be the prevailing rate of inﬂation. Market participants
have ample incentive and ability to anticipate the likely direction of change in
the economy. So both backward- and forward-looking behavior are grounded
in common sense. However the more important scientiﬁc questions involve
the extent to which either type of behavior drives the dynamics of inﬂation
and is therefore important for thinking about the consequences of alternative
policy choices.
25 Dotsey (2002) and Sbordone (2006).
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The Importance of Inﬂation Persistence for
Policymakers
Related to the question of whether forward- or backward-looking behavior
drives inﬂation dynamics is the question of how stable people’s inﬂation ex-
pectations are. The backward-looking characterization suggests a stickiness
in beliefs, implying that it would be hard to induce people to change their ex-
pectations. If relatively high inﬂation expectations become ingrained, then it
would be difﬁcult to get people to expect a decline in inﬂation. This describes
asituationinwhichdisinﬂationcouldbeverycostly, sinceonlypersistentevi-
denceofchangesinactualinﬂationwouldmovefutureexpectations. Evidence
discussed earlier from episodes of dramatic changes in the conduct of policy,
however, suggests that people can be convinced that policy has changed. In
a sense, the tradeoffs faced by a policymaker could depend on the extent to
which people’s expectations are subject to change. If people are uncertain
and actively seeking to learn about the central bank’s approach to policy, then
expectations might move around in a way that departs from the very persis-
tent, backward-looking characterization. But this movement in expectations
would depend on the central bank’s actions and statements about its conduct
of policy.
The periods that Goodfriend (1993) described as inﬂation scares can be
seen as periods when people’s assessment of likely future policy was chang-
ing rather ﬂuidly. Even very recently, we have seen episodes that could be
described as “mini scares.” For instance, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina
in late 2005, markets’ immediate response to rising energy prices suggested
expectations of persistently rising inﬂation. Market participants, it seems,
were uncertain as to how much of a run-up in general inﬂation the Fed would
allow. Inﬂation expectations moved back down after a number of FOMC
members made speeches emphasizing their focus on preserving low inﬂation.
This episode illustrates both the potential for the Fed to inﬂuence inﬂation ex-
pectations and the extent to which market participants are at times uncertain
as to how the Fed will respond to new developments.
4. MAKING POLICY
While the scientiﬁc dialogue continues, policymakers must make judgments
based on their understanding of the state of the debate. At the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Richmond, policy opinions and recommendations have long
been guided by a view that the short-term costs of reducing inﬂation de-
pend on expectations. This view implies that central bank credibility—that
is, the public’s level of conﬁdence about the central bank’s future patterns of
behavior—is an important aspect of policymaking. Central bank credibility
makes it less costly to return inﬂation to a desirable level after it has been
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viewofpolicyisconsistentwithaviewofthePhillipscurveinwhichinﬂation
persistence is primarily a consequence of the conduct of policy.
The evidence is perhaps not yet deﬁnitive. As outlined in our argument,
however, we do ﬁnd support for our view in the broad contours of the history
of U.S. inﬂation over the last several decades. At a time when a consensus
developed in the economics profession that the Phillips curve tradeoff could
be exploited by policymakers, apparent attempts to do so led to or contributed
to the decidedly unsatisfactory economic performance of the 1970s. And
the improved performance that followed coincided with the solidiﬁcation of
the profession’s understanding of the role of expectations. We also see the
initial costs of bringing down inﬂation in the early 1980s as consistent with
our emphasis on expectations and credibility. After the experience of the
1970s, credibility was low, and expectations responded slowly to the Fed’s
disinﬂationary policy actions. Still, the response of expectations was faster
than might be implied by a backward-looking Phillips curve.
Wealsoviewpolicymakingonthebasisofaforward-lookingunderstand-
ing of the Phillips curve as a prudent approach. A hybrid Phillips curve with
a backward-looking component presents greater opportunities for exploiting
the short-run tradeoff. In a sense, it assumes that the monetary policymaker
has more inﬂuence over real economic activity than is assumed by the purely
forward-looking speciﬁcation. Basing policy on a backward-looking formu-
lation would also risk underestimating the extent to which movements in in-
ﬂation can generate shifts in inﬂation expectations, which could work against
the policymaker’s intentions. Again, the experience of past decades suggests
the risks associated with policymaking under the assumption that policy can
persistently inﬂuence real activity more than it really can. In our view, these
risks point to the importance of a policy that makes expectational stability its
centerpiece.
5. CONCLUSION
One key lesson from the history of the relationship between inﬂation and real
activity is that any short-run tradeoff depends on people’s expectations for
inﬂation. Ultimately, monetary policy has its greatest impact on real activity
when it deviates from people’s expectations. But if a central bank tries to
deviatefrompeople’sexpectationsrepeatedly, soastosystematicallyincrease
real output growth, people’s expectations will adjust.
There are also, we think, important lessons in the observation that overall
economic performance, in terms of both real economic activity and inﬂation,
was much improved beginning in the 1980s as compared to that in the pre-
ceding decade. While this improvement could have some external sources
related to the kinds of shocks that affect the economy, it is also likely that
improved conduct of monetary policy played a role. In particular, monetaryJ. M. Lacker and J. A. Weinberg: Inﬂation and Unemployment 225
policy was able to persistently lower inﬂation by responding more to signs of
rising inﬂation or inﬂation expectations than had been the case in the past. At
the same time, the variability of inﬂation fell, while ﬂuctuations in output and
unemployment were also moderating.
We think the observed behavior of policy and economic performance is
directly linked to the lessons from the history of the Phillips curve. Both
point to the importance of the expectational consequences of monetary policy
choices. An approach to policy that is able to stabilize expectations will be
most able to maintain low and stable inﬂation with minimal effects on real
activity. It is the credible maintenance of price stability that will in turn allow
real economic performance to achieve its potential over the long run. This
will not eliminate the business cycle since the economy will still be subject
to shocks that quicken or slow growth. We believe the history of the Phillips
curve shows that monetary policy’s ability to add to economic variability by
overreacting to shocks is greater than its ability to reduce real variability, once
it has achieved credibility for low inﬂation.
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